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"My keenest interest is excited, not by what are called great questions and
great cases, but by little decisions which the common run of selectors would pass
by because they did not deal with the Constitution or a telephone company, yet
which have in them the germ of some wider theory, and therefore of some pro-
found interstitial change in the very tissue of the law."--OLVER WENDELL HOLMES,
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1920) 269.
Comments
CLOSED SHOP AGREEMENTS
The closed shop' and activities by unions designed to achieve it have prob-
ably received in the past more criticism from the courts than any other labor device
or activity.2 Long after unionization and other forms of collective agreements
received the approval of the courts, the closed shop often continued under the
1. For the purposes of this article there is no significant difference between
the closed and the union shop and so, for purposes of brevity, the term closed shop
alone will be used.
2. Fumerton, The Collective Bargaining Agreement and its Legal Effects
(1943) 18 WASH. L. REV. 1-5; LANDIS, CASES ON LABOR LAW (1934) 1-37.
1
et al.: Editorial Board/Comments
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1945
judicial ban as a device to interfere with employment and in restraint of trade.a
Only when the economic advantages to employers of industrial peace and stability
in labor relations flowing from closed shop agreements became apparent did the
courts begin to change their attitudes toward such agreements.4
The N.L.R.A.5 gave a great impetus to the acceptance of the closed shop as
a legitimate form of employer-employee relationship. The Act itself was not designed
to encourage closed shop agreements as appears from the committee report:
".. . The bill does nothing to facilitate closed-shop agreements or to make
them legal in any state where they may be illegal; it does not interfere
with the status quo on this debatable subject, but leaves the way open
to such agreements as might now legally be consummated, with two excep-
tions..,
But the statute, aside from its effect of encouraging all collective bargaining, was
a definite legislative declaration setting out in permanent form 7 the new attitude
toward closed shop agreements and so guaranteed that this attitude of acceptance
would continue.
3. Despres, The Collective Agreement for the Union Shop (1939) 7 U. OF
CHI. L. REv. 24, 33-41. The treatment of the courts, of course, was not uniform.
Some courts, through hostility to labor organizations, developed rather extreme
doctrines of "monopoly" as applied to closed shop agreements. The New Jersey
courts did this in a long line of decisions exemplified by Brennan v. United Hatters
of North America, 73 N. J. LAW 729, 65 Atl. 165 (1906); Upholsterers' Intl.
Union v. Essex Reed & Fibre Co., 12 N. J. Misc. 637, 174 ATL. 207 (1934). Other
courts, having a more enlightened attitude toward labor organizations, held closed
shop agreements valid, as by 1905 the N. Y. court had done in Jacobs v. Cohen,
183 N. Y. 207, 76 N. E. 5 (1905). The courts have often considered such factors
as whether the union was open or closed as in Shinsky v. O'Neil, 232 Mass. 99, 121
N. E. 790 (1919) and Wilson v. Newspaper & Mail Delivers' Union, 123 N. J. Eq.
347, 197 Atl. 720, 721 (1938); and the extent of closed shop agreements in the
district by the union involved, Polk v. Cleveland Ry., 20 Ohio App. 317, 151 N. E.
808 (1925); McCord v. Thompson-Starrett Co. 129 App. Div. 130, 113 N. Y. Supp.
385 (1908), aff'd, 198 N. Y. 587, 92 N. E. 1090 (1910). A closed union and a large
percentage of other closed shop agreements in the particular industry being factors
that influence the courts toward a holding of restraint of trade. Note (1940) 49
YALE L. REv. 755, illustrates the operation of these rules and the dangers of their'
use by anti-labor judges.
4. Despres, The Collective Agreement for the Union Shop (1939) 7 U. OF
CI. L. REV. 24, 29-30.
5. 49 STAT. 449-457 (1935), 29 U. S. C. §§ 151-166 (1940).
6. Sen. Rep. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 11-12.
7. Sec. 8 (3) "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(3) By
discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization;
Provided, That nothing in this Act . . . or any other statute of the United States,
shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization
(not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in this Act as an
unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employment membership therein,
if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided in
section 9 (a) in the appropriate collective bargaining unit covered by such agree-
ment when made." 49 STAT. 449-457 (1935), 294 S. C. § 151-166 (1940).
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Requirements of a Valid Closed Shop Agreement
In order that a valid closed shop agreement may be negotiated under the N.L.
R.A., it is necessary that the provisions of Section 8(3) be strictly followed. That
provision8 requires: (1) that the union making the agreement must not be estab-
lished, maintained or assisted by any unfair labor practice; (2) that the union be
the representative of the majority of the employees as provided for by Section 9(a)
of the N.L.R.A. and (3) that the preceding two conditions existed when the con-
tract was made.
The usual types of cases in which the validity of closed shop agreements arise
are (1) where the employer has enforced the agreement and fired non-union em-
ployees or done other acts that without a closed shop agreement would be unfair
labor practices; or (2) where a union not a party to the agreement is attempting
to secure certification as bargaining agent. Obviously, it is the party asserting the
invalidity of the agreement who bears the burden of proving the fact.0
The first condition precedent for a valid closed shop agreement is violated
when the agreement Is made with a company-dominated union.10 Such agreements
have been considered by the courts and the Board"' and have uniformly been held
invalid.' 2 When proceeding beyond the company-dominated union to cases where
the maintenance and assistance is not quite so flagrant, the ground for invalidat-
ing a closed shop clause becomes less certain. For this purpose it would be well
to look for factors which commonly lead to a union's being adjudged company-
dominated.13 For in a particular case sufficient of these factors might be present to
make the union "maintained or assisted" for the purpose of invalidating a closed
shop agreement, and yet not be sufficient to make it a dominated union subject to
being disestablished under section 8(2)."4
8. See note 7 supra.
9. Sperry Gyroscope Co. Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 129 F. (2d) 922, 928 (C.C.A.
2nd, 1942); N.L.R.B. v. Mason Mfg. Co., 126 F. (2d) 810, 813 (C.C.A. 9th, 1942).
10. Section 8 (2) of the N.L.R.A. provided that it is an unfair labor prac-
tice "To dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor
organization or contribute financial or other support to it." 49 STAT. 449-457 (1935),
29 U. S. C. § 151-166 (1940).
11. National Labor Relations Board.
12. Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. N.L.R.B., 319 U. S. 533, 63 Sup. Ct. 1214
(1943); Sperr' Gyroscope v. N.L.R.B. 129 F. (2d) 922 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1942); Corn-
ing Glass Works v. N.L.R.B., 118 F. (2d) 625 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1941); N.L.R.B. v.
J. Greenebaum Tanning Co., 110 F. (2d) 984 (C.C.A. 7th, 1940); N.L.R.B. v.
Pacific Greyhound Lines, 106 F. (2d) 867 (C.C.A. 9th, 1939); Hamilton-Brown
Shoe Co. v. N.L.R.B., (United Shoe Workers of America, Local 125, Intervener)
Boot & Shoe Workers Union v. N.L.R.B., 104 F. (2d) 49 (C.C.A. 8th, 1939); Ron-
rico Corp. and Puerto Rico Distilling Co., 53 N.L.R.B. 1137 (1943); Lancaster
Iron Works, Inc., 20 N.L.R.B. 738 (1940); Auburn Foundry, Inc., 14 N.L.R.B.
1219 (1939).
13. Titan Metal Mfg. Co. (Titan Employees Protective Ass'rr, Intervenors)
v. N.L.R.B., 106 F. (2d) 254, 261-263 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1939); Crager, Company Unions
Under the N.L.R.A. (1942) 40 MicH. L. REv. 831, 839-49; Notes (1941) 27 VIR.
L. REv. 359, 367-375.
14. 49 STAT. 452 § 8 (2) (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 158 (2) (1940).
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This seems to be the position of the Supreme Court in International Ass'n
v. N.L.R.B.1 5 This test is, perhaps broader than that provided for by the statute
which condemns acts of assistance "defined in this Act as an unfair labor prac-
tice."16 But the necessities of the situation require this extension of the literal
language of the statute because, as has been frequently pointed out by the courts,
slight indications of an employer's attitude or action of supervisory employees may
lead to drastic changes in the attitude of the employees, who depend for their sole
livelihood on their continued employment.lr
This result is also caused by the fact that the Board will not order the
disestablishment of an organization affiliated with a national body, even though
under like circumstances such an order would be issued to a company union.28
Therefore, when a nationally affiliated union is involved, as was true of the Inter-
national Ass'n case, there can be no finding of company domination, but the factors
that would lead to such a holding must be considered to determine the independ-
ence of the union from employer control or assistance for the purposes of section
8(3).
Assistance may be of two major types: (1) that which leads to the establish-
ment of the union as majority representative,S or (2) that which helps to maintain
membership in a union which formerly had obtained an unassisted majority. In
International Ass'n v. N.L.R.B.20 the Union, affiliated with the A.F. of L. was
established and a majority membership in the unit secured by the employer acting
through supervisory employees. A closed shop agreement made after this activity
was held void. In N.L.R.B. v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co.,21 the Unions, A.F. of L.
affiliates, formerly had an uncoerced majority and when a C.I.O. union began to
make gains in the plant, the employer assisted the affiliates by personally encour-
aging membership in them and also by a shutdown at the affiliates' request. A
closed shop agreement subsequently negotiated was held invalid. In N.L.R.B. v.
John Engelhorn & Sons,22 the A.F. of L. affiliate was a bona fide union, but was
later assisted in acquiring members by a drive carried on by supervisory employees
and by threats of a shutdown if the C.I.O. was successful in its drive. The closed
shop agreement then negotiated with the A.F. of L. union was held invalid. In
15. International Ass'n v. N.L.R.B., 311 U. S. 72, 61 Sup. Ct. 83 (1940).
16. BUFFORD, WAGNER AcT EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYER RELATIONS, § 194,
p. 549.
17. Sperry Gyroscope Co., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 129 F. (2d) 922, 927 (C.C.A.
2nd, 1942); N.L.R.B. v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U. S. 584, 588, 61 Sup. Ct. 358,
(1941); H. J. Heinz Co. v. N.L.R.B., 311 U. S. 514, 520, 61 Sup. Ct. 320,
(1941); N.L.R.B. v. Moench- Tanning Co., 121 F. (2d) 951, 953 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1941).
18. Notes (1941) 27 VA. L. REv. 359, 366.
19. This type of assistance includes actions ranging from inducing the estab-
lishment of a union, to aiding a minority union to obtain a majority representation.
20. International Ass'n v. N.L.R.B., 311 U. S. 72, 61 Sup. Ct. 83 (1940).
21. N.L.R.B. v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co., 315 U. S. 685, 62 Sup. Ct. 846
(1942).
22. N.L.R.B. v. John Engelhorn & Sons, 134 F. (2d) 553 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1943).
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this last case23 the C.I.O. Union was claiming a majority representation at the same
time, but the employer ignored this and immediately negotiated the closed shop
agreement with the A.F. of L. 'affiliate. The court held that the' speed with which
the company negotiated the contract was evidence of assistance to the contracting
union.24 It is to be noted that this is one of the factors which often lead a court-
in conjunction with other matters-to uphold a Board determination of company
domination, but it is not strictly an unfair labor practice.
If the labor organization is found free from employer assistance, only the first
hurdle to establishing a valid contract has been surmounted. Compliance with
the second requirement must be shown by proving that the organization repre-
sented a majority of the employees for purposes of making the agreement. Sec-
tion 9(a) 25 which governs this matter refers to "Representatives designated or
selected for the purposes of collective bargaining." Some cqurt; have intimated that
mere membership in a union is not sufficient to satisfy this requirement; but that
it must appear either: (1) that membership in the union by its constitution or
by-laws automatically designated the union as bargaining agent,26 or (2) that a
specific authorization for bargaining was given by the employer to the union.27
Some courts have intimated that they would require a specific authorization to the
representatives to negotiate a closed shop agreement.28 But this requirement seems
too extreme. Closed 'shop agreements have become sufficiently, common that it
might be reasonably expected that the bargaining representatives might attempt
to secure such a clause in an agreement if it seemed possible to do so. And it
would place a great burden on the union representatives in bargaining to have to
stop in the middle of negotiations to secure the proper authorization before pro-
ceeding.
If the bargaining representatives have been properly authorized, it is necessary
for this authorization to have been given by a majority of the employees in the
appropriate unit.29 It is not necessary that the Board should have certified the
23. See note 21 supra.
24.' N.L.R.B. v. John Engelhorn & Sons, 134 F. (2d) 553, 556 (C.C.A. 3rd,
1943). This factor was also noted and given the same effect in Hamilton-Brown
Shoe Co. v. N.L.R.B. (United Shoe Workers of America, Local 125, Intervener),
104 F. (2d) 49 (C.C.A. 8th, 1939), where there was negotiation of a closed shop
agreement with a company-dominated union.
25. 49 STAT. 453, 29 U. S. C. § 159 (a).
26. N.L.R.B. v. Hollywood-Maxwell Co., 126 F. (2d) 815, 819-820 (C.C.A.
9th, 1942). In this case members of the Union executed signed revocations of the
power of the Union to bargain for them, but they continued to be members of the
Union. The court held that the Union then had no power to negotiate for members
who had revoked.
27. See N.L.R.B. v. Mason Mfg. Co. 126 F. (2d) 810, 813 (C.C.A. 9th, 1942).
28. See note 27 supra.
29. Eastwood-Nealley Corp. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, Dist. No.
47, 124 N. J. EQ. 274, 1 At. (2d) 477 (1938); N.L.R.B. v. National Motor Bear-
ing Co., 105 F. (2d) 652, 659-660 (C.C.A. 9th, 1938).
Vol. 10
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union for the negotiation of a valid closed shop agreement, 30 but the majority
representation must exist in fact. The employer in making an agreement with
a union not certified by the N.L.R.B. at the time does so at his peril. For if the
majority of the union is doubtful, if Board investigation 'of the union is pending,3'
or if a majority claims of a rival union have been presented,3 2 then the employer is on
notice of a dispute as to majority representation and no agreement negotiated
while this dispute continues is valid.
Compliance with the two conditions above discussed must have existed at the
time the agreement was made. 33 The fact that the labor organization at some future
date becomes an unassisted organization and/or acquires a majority representation
would not relate back to validate the closed shop agreement made without existence
of these two conditions. It is obvious that a labor organization having a closed
shop agreement will soon acquire a majority of the employees.
If any of the three requirements of validity of the agreement are not present,
the agreement is void. An employer firing for failure to join or maintain member-
ship in the union will be guilty of discrimination under sections 8(1) and 8(3) of
the Act. The agreement would be no bar to having another election to determine
the proper bargaining agent
If a valid closed shop agreement has been negotiated, an agreement with repre-
sentatives of an uncoerced majority of employees at the time made, then a relation-
ship has been established which allows the employer to take certain actions other-
wise condemned by the Act as unfair labor practices and the employees are hence-
forth restricted in their freedom to join, to refrain from joining or to change unions.
Consequences of a Valid Closed Shop Agreement
Assuming the negotiation of a valid closed shop agreement, the employer has
the right to demand membership in the union as a condition of employment.34 It
should be noted that the exercise of this right by the employer is conditioned on
his giving notice of the existence of the closed shop agreement to his employees
before any actions are taken to enforce it 5 For otherwise the employee might
refuse to join and think that he was exercising his rights under the Act.
30. M and M Wood Working Co. v. Plywood & Veneer Workers Local Union
No. 102, 23 F. Supp. 11 (D. C. Ore., 1938), aff'd, 101 F. (2d) 938 (C.C.A. 9th,
1939).
31. Malden Electric Co., 33 N.L.R.B. 78 (1941); Imperial Lighting Products
Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 1408 (1942); Boston Store of Chicago, Inc., 37 N.L.R.B. 1140
(1941); General Motors Corp., Frigidaire Division, 37 N.L.R.B. 616 (1941).
32. N.L.R.B. v. Joh-n Engelhorn & Sons, 132 F. (2d) 553 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1943);
Fine Art Novelty Corp., 54 N.L.R.B. 480 (1944); Philip J. Byer d/b/a Ideal
Chair Mfg. Co., 36 N.L.R.B. 844 (1941); Columbus & Southern Ohio Electric Co.,
36 N.L.R.B. 386 (1941).
33. N.L.R.B. v. John Engelhorn & Sons, 134 F. (2d) 553, 557 (C.C.A. 3rd,
1943); N.L.R.B. v. Mason Mfg. Co., 126 F. (2d) 810, 813 (C.C.A. 9th, 1942);
Warehousemen's Union v. N.L.R.B., 121 F. (2d) 84, 87 (App. D. C. 1941).
34. M & M Wood Working Co. v. N.L.R.B., 101 F. (2d) 938, 940 (C.C.A. 9th,
1939); N.L.R.B. v. Lion Shoe Co., 97 F. (2d) 448, 457 (C.C.A. 1st, 1938).
35. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co., 8 N.L.R.B. 112, 122 (1939).
1945] COMMENTS
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The employer may discharge for simple failure to join the union,30 or for indi-
vidual shift of union membership. 37 The employer may not fire merely because
employees advocate changing union membership 38 nor because they urge new
workers not to join the union.3 9 As long as the individual workers maintain mem-
bership in good standing in the union, the employer has no grounds for taking
action against them.
4 0
After the agreement is made, the employer may give more aid and assistance to
the union than before; though the extent of this has not been defined by the courts
or the Board. He probably may refuse to allow rival union representatives to have
access to the place of business or to employees and allow such privileges to the bar-
gaining union. In the Waterman Steamship Corp. case41 the Board and court held
this an unfair labor practice under an agreement for preferential hiring, but
based this only on the fact that it would prevent a fair election. This would not
be involved where a legitimate closed shop agreement had been negotiated.
A much more complicated problem which arises is that which occurs when
there is a shift of majority representation from the bargaining union to another
during the term of the closed shop agreement. Should the agreement be held a bar
to certification of representatives? Should an election be held to determine the
present desires of the employees as to bargaining representatives? Or should the
employer be allowed to fire the employees leaving the bargaining union even though
they represent a majority of the employees?
To determine the answers to these questions, it is necessary to notice two
important and in this case seemingly opposed policies behind the N.L.R.A.: (1)
The desire to establish stability in industrial relationships and (2) the desire to
enforce the democratic right of allowing the majority to be represented by a union
of their own choosing.
Collective bakgaining should bring stability into industrial relations and de-
crease industrial strife. This would seem to be accomplished by enforcing collective
bargaining agreements when they are validly made. A closed shop agreement
would be a particularly effective device to bring about stable employer-employee
relationships.42 But if a rival union enters the field and a majority of the em-
ployees change their affiliation to that union, Serious doubt arises as to whether
enforcing the closed shop agreement with the first union leads to stability of rela-
tionship. In New York, the Court of Appeals in the Triboro case43 refused to allow
36. Aeolian-American Corp., 8 N.L.R.B. 1043 (1938); United Fruit Co., 12
N.L.R.B. 404 (1939); Sbicca, Inc., 30 N.L.R.B. 60 (1941).
37. United Fruit Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 404 (1939).
38. Ansley Radio Corp., 18 N.L.R.B. 1028, 1042-43 (1939).
39. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co., 18 N.L.R.B. 591 (1939).
40. Ansley Radio Corp., 18 N.L.R.B. 1028 (1939).
41. N.L.R.B. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 309 U. S. 206, 226, 60 Sup. Ct.
493,503 (1940).
42. ROSENFARB, THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY AND How IT WORKS (1940)
270.
43. Triboro Coach Corp., v. N. Y. State Labor Relations Board, 286 N. Y.
314, 36 N. E. (2d) 315 (1941).
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the state board to certify the second union as the bargaining agent where there
was a subsisting closed shop agreement and this decision was immediately followed
by a strike of the members of the second union. 44 The result of this case cer-
tainly did not lead to stable industrial relations.
The closed shop agreement also adds to the stability of the union because such
an agreement gives it a stable membership and income, makes more easy relation-
ship with the employer, because there is then no worry of his discouraging union-
ization, and because friction between union and non-union workers is eliminated.
Yet this same stability may lead to lack of participation by the general member-
ship of the union and to a corrupt, autocratic leadership.
Collective bargaining under the N.L.R.A. is intended to be not only a stabiliz-
ing, but also a democratic process whereby only representatives of the majority
can make binding agreements as to terms and conditions of employment. Too
often before this Act was enacted conditions of employment were determined only
by the employer, or with the small group of employees with which he was willing
to deal, with no participation by the mass of the employees. The Act has changed
this to require that the bargaining union must be the representative of the majority
of the workers in the unit in order to negotiate a valid agreement.45 But if this
is the only time that a majority representation of the union is required, turnover
of workers in the plant or change in economic conditions may lead the majority
of the workers in the unit at some later date to desire another union to represent
them. If the agreement that was negotiated had a closed shop clause, the problem
becomes much more acute. And if coupled with a closed shop provision, there is a
clause for automatic renewal of the agreement except on notice, if the agreement re-
mains in effect, the workers will be bound to the union without hope of escape. But
what of the employer who had made an agreement with the union and made his
calculations of costs and production time on the basis of it. Must he be forced
to negotiate a new agreement whenever a majority of the workers desire a change
of unions?
In order to solve these problems, one must resort to the basic theory" of the
collective bargaining agreement. In the past three main theories have been used
to justify enforcement of such agreements: (1) custom- and usage,46 (2) agency,47
and (3) third party beneficiary.48 Under any of these theories the individual
worker could repudiate the collective agreement and make his individual terms with
the employer; 49 for a custom may be varied by an express agreement, the third
party may waive the terms of the contract made for his benefit; and a principal
44. New York Times, August 9, 1941.
45. 49 STAT. 45.3 (1935); 29 U. S. C. § 159 (a) (1940).
46. Illinois Cent. Ry. v. Moore, 112 F. (2d) 959 (C.C.A. 5th, 1940).
47. Mueller v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 194 Minn. 83, 259 N. W. 798 (1935).
48. Yazoo & M. V. R. R. v. Sideboard, 161 .Miss. 4, 133 So. 669 (1931).
49. Note (1942) 56 HARv. L REv. 294, 295; Hamilton, Individual Rights
Arising from Collective Labor Contracts (1938) 3 Mo. LAW REv. 252.
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certainly may repudiate his agent and negotiate for himself. 0 This result is clearly
opposed to the policy of the N.L.R.A.
Collective agreements cannot be dealt with adequately using the tools of
individualistic contract doctrine.51 The far-reaching social and economic effects
of these agreements prevent their being treated as the private property of the
bargaining parties. The collective agreement is, in character, quasi-legislative
52
and sets up normative terms of employment"3 which result from the statutory
requirement that the majority bargaining agent shall be the representative of all
employees-union and non-union-for the purpose of bargaining as to wages, hours
and conditions of employment. The terms and conditions of employment are estab-
lished by this statutory representative without regard for the desires of non-union
workers and can be changed only by expiration or the efforts of a representative
who fulfills the requirements of the statute as to majority representation. The
normative terms remain in force either: (1) for the period of the agreement or
until varied by a new agreement if the parties maintain their ability to negotiate
such a new agreement; that is, if the union continues to be majority representative;
or (2) for a reasonable time after the negotiation of the agreement if the parties
lose their ability to negotiate a new agreement; that is, if the union no longer is
majority representative and its representative capacity is properly challenged.
This quasi-legislative or normative effect of the collective agreement has been
recognized by the Supreme Court in the J. L Case Co. case 4 and only on such
a theory can the actions of the Board be justified when it allows a certification of
representatives while a valid agreement is in existence.55
Using this approach to the problem of the change of majority representation
during the existence of a valid agreement, the two basic policies of the Act, sta-
bility and democracy, can both be satisfied. The stability is achieved because the
normative terms remain in force for a reasonable period of time, say the one
year which the Board now usually requires between the negotiation of the agree-
ment and a new certification.5 6 The democracy is achieved by allowing certifica-
50. Witmer, Collective Labor Agreements in the Courts (1938) 48 YALE L.
REv. 195, 227, 235.
51. Comment (1944) 9 Mo. L. REV. 260; Notes (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 465, 471.
52. 1 TELLER, LABOR DisPuTEs & COLLECTIvE BARGAINING (1940) §§ 154-68;
Lenhoff, The Present Status of Collective Contracts in the American Legal System
(1941) 39 MIcH. L. REV. 1109, 1137; Rice, The Legal Significance of Labor Con-
tracts under the N.L.R. Act (1939) 37 MIcH. L. REv. 693, 695; Witmer, Collective
Labor Agreements in the Courts (1938) 48 YALE L. J. 195-99.
53. Hoeniger, The Individual Employment Contract Under the Wagner Act
(1941) 10 FORDHAM L. REv. 14, 35; Comment (1944) 9 Mo. L. REv. 263; Notes
(1942) 56 H~Av. L, REv. 294, 297; (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 695, 700.
54. J. I. Case Co. v. N.L.R.B., 321 U. S. 332, 64 Sup. Ct. 576, (1944).
55. Comment (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 465, 467.
56. Comment (1942) 37 ILL. L. REv. 43, 47; Pacific Greyhound Lines, 22
N.L.R.B. 111, 131 (1940); Pressed Steel Car Co. Inc., 36 N.L.R.B. 560 (1941);
7 N.L.R.B. Annual Report (1942) 55.
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tion after a reasonable period whenever sufficient proof of a change of majority
representation is presented.
57
By looking at several typical situations we can determine the result of apply-
ing this quasi-legislative or normative theory. If a petition for representation is
made to the Board, or notice of a new majority is given to the employer when an
existing agreement is about to terminate or within time for termination, then cer-
tification will be allowed and any agreement negotiated by the employer after such
notice is not a bar to certification.r s Normative terms of employment can be
made only after a determination of the question of majority representation. In
such a case as this where there was a closed shop clause in the old agreement, the
Board will usually allow a much less conclusive showing of majority representation
as a ground for holding an election."9
Where a valid closed shop agreement is in existence and will not terminate
or be terminable in the near future, the Board has usually based its decision of
refusing or allowing a new election on the length of time that the agreement has
been in force. If the agreement is to run for only a year or has not been in force
for a year, the Board will usually deny or postpone an election, indulging in a
rebuttable presumption of continued majority representation for a year.60
But where the agreement has been in force for more than a year and will
not terminate within another year, the Board has generally allowed certification or
held the contract no defense to charges of unfair labor practices for attempting to
enforce the closed shop provision.61 The Board at first held that the second union
certified was "substituted"62 in the agreement for the first union, thus carrying out
the quasi-legislative or normative effect of the collective agreement. But in recent
cases the Board has not referred to this theory.
57. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios,7 N.L.R.B. 662, 697 (1938); Volupte, Inc.,
22 N.L.R.B. 1029 (1940); Kahn & Feldman, Inc., 30 N.L.R.B. 294 (1941); Willys
Overland Motors, Inc., 52 N.L.R.B. 109, 110 (1943); Cramp Shipbuilding Co., 52
N.L.R.B. 309, 311 (1943).
58. Comment (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 465, 467; Comment (1942) 37 ILL. L.
REv. 43, 45; 7 N.L.R.B. Annual Report (1942) 55; U. S. Bedding Co., 52 N.L.R.B.
382 (1943); H. D. Oberdorfer, 34 N.L.R.B. 683 (1941); Adolph Weinfeld and
Henry Weinfeld, 35 N.L.R.B. 257 (1941); Max Hoffman, 25 N.L.R.B. 311 (1940).
59. Oregon Plywood Co., 33 N.L.R.B. 1234 (1941); Belmont Radio Corp.,
27 N.L.R.B. 341 (1940); George W. Borg Corp., 25 N.L.R.B. 481 (1940).
60. See note 56 supra. But in Food Machinery Corp., 36 N.L.R.B. 491 (1941)
the Board ordered an election after a closed shop agreement had run only 6 months
where the original union had become inactive.
61. In these cases elections were ordered by the Board where closed shop
agreements were in existence: Presto Recording Corp., 34 N.L.R.B. 28 (1941);
National Battery Co., 28 N.L.R.B. 826 (1940); Borg-Warner Corp., 19 N.L.R.B.
538 (1940); M. & J. Tracy, Inc., 12 N.L.R.B. 936 (1939); Pacific Greyhound Lines,
22 N.L.R.B. 111, 131 n. 57 (1940). In Transformer Corp. of America, 26 N.L.R.B.
476 (1940), there was an injunction ordering the employer to hire only members
of the bargaining union, but the Board nevertheless ordered an election.
62. M & M Wood Working Co., 6 N.L.R.B. 372 (1938); 1 N.L.R.B. Annual
Report (1936) 108; 2 N.L.R.B. Annual Report (1937) 118.
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Since the appropriation bill of July 12, 194313 for the Board which provided
that funds appropriated should not be used in connection with a complaint case
arising over an agreement or renewal which had been in existence for three months
without complaint being filed, there could be no complaint issued for actions taken
under an invalid closed shop agreement unless, under the change made in the
statute of 1944,64 it was made with a company dominated union. But this has
no effect on certification cases, for the statute states only that a complaint shall
not issue. The Board has so held in a number of recent cases. 5
Conclusion
A closed shop agreement to be valid under the N.L.R.B. must be made only
with the representative of an uncoerced and unassisted majority at the time it is
made. A valid collective bargaining agreement is quasi-legislative in effect and
establishes normative terms of employment which cannot be changed except by
the original parties for a reasonable time (usually one year) after they are made.
But if the agreement establishing the normative terms has been in existence for
more than a year and will not terminate within another year, an election may be
held to select a new statutory representative who may negotiate new normative
terms.
M. MARING
63. Title IV, Act of July 12, 1943, Public Law 135, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 515,
"No Part of the funds appropriated in this title shall be used in any way in con-
nection with a complaint case arising over an agreement between management and
labor which has been in existence for three months or longer with'out complaint
being filed .. "
64. Title IV, Act of June 28, 1944, Public Law 373, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess.
A proviso was added "That these limitations shall not apply to agreements with
labor organizations formed in violation of section 158, paragraph 2, title 29, United
States Code."
65. Letellier-Phillips Paper Co. Inc., 54 N.L.R.B. 1111, 1113 (1944); Cali-
fornia Door Co., 52 N.L.R.B. 68 (1943); U. S. Bedding Co., 52 N.L.R.B. 382
(1943); Max Mordka & Flora Mordka, Co-partners d/b/a Memo Leather Goods
Co., 52 N.L.R.B. 625 (1943).
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